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A  shift away from the taxation
of capital toward taxation of
consumption is potentially welfare-
enhancing….[E]ven larger welfare
gains might be obtained by substituting
consumption taxes for taxes
on labor income.
The belief that the U.S. tax code ought to
treat capital more favorably than it currently
does has become a perennial of political dis-
course in recent years. Proposed changes in the
tax code have ranged from the relatively mod-
est, such as reducing the tax rate on capital
gains, to the more radical, such as a switch to a
flat tax (which would eliminate double taxation
of capital income) and “ending the IRS as we
know it.” Reform proposals are usually accom-
panied by claims that the reforms, if imple-
mented, would yield a myriad of benefits to
taxpayers generally, foremost among these
benefits being an increase in the economy’s
long-run growth rate. Yet it is only in the past
decade or so that economists have developed
the tools that allow us to assess the validity of
these claims. The objectives of this article are,
first, to present some comparative statistics on
how heavily capital is taxed in the United States
relative to the other major industrialized coun-
tries; second, to outline a simple model that
allows us to address some of the claims about
how changes in the capital tax rate would affect
the economy’s long-run growth rate and the
well-being of the average household; and third,
to perform some simple “reform experiments”
illustrating the potential magnitude of the gains
that could accompany tax reforms.
The basic principles of optimal taxation
were first worked out by Ramsey (1927). One of
Ramsey’s contributions was to demonstrate for-
mally that under certain circumstances the opti-
mal tax rates on different commodities would be
inversely proportional to their elasticities of sup-
ply and demand. That is, if the supply or de-
mand for some commodity is absolutely inelastic,
then all tax revenue should be raised by taxing
that commodity because doing so will entail no
loss of welfare. In the short run, the quantity of
capital supplied to productive activities is in
fixed supply, and arguably, therefore, one should
raise as much revenue as possible from taxes on
capital.1 However it was not until the 1970s that
economists developed a deeper understanding
of the welfare costs of financing government
expenditures with taxes on capital.
Feldstein (1978, 1974a, and 1974b) pre-
sented the pioneering analysis that challenged
the notion that we could safely abstract from
the decision to accumulate capital when evalu-
ating the welfare costs of capital taxation, albeit
in environments that restricted the response of
either households or markets to policy changes.
The first general equilibrium analysis of the
effects of capital taxation was presented by
Chamley (1981), who studied the welfare con-
2sequences of eliminating a tax on capital.
A more detailed analysis was presented by
Judd (1987), who compared the welfare cost
associated with the taxation of capital and
labor income.
All these studies (and a substantial number
of others) found that there would be significant
welfare gains associated with the elimination
of capital income taxation or, more realistically,
the replacement of such taxation with higher
taxes on consumption and labor. However, none
of these studies allowed for any feedback to
the long-run growth rate of the economy. All
the analyses were conducted in the context
of models in which the long-run growth rate
was determined exogenously, or by factors
outside the model. Insofar as the elimination
or reduction of tax rates on capital income had
any growth effects, they were transitory as the
economy adjusted to a new long-run growth
path. It was not until the development of
models of endogenous growth in the 1980s
that economists could begin to ask whether
tax policy had any effect on the economy’s
long-run growth rate. These models, which
were pioneered by Romer (1986), Lucas (1988),
and Rebelo (1991), were in part motivated
by the desire to construct a framework within
which we could begin to meaningfully address
the very long-run consequences of certain
policies (this was especially true in the case of
Rebelo 1991).
The seminal study of tax policy in the
context of an endogenous growth model is by
Lucas (1990, 293 and 314), who writes:
When I left graduate school, in 1963,
I believed that the single most desirable
change in the U.S. tax structure would be
the taxation of capital gains as ordinary
income. I now believe that neither capital
gains nor any of the income from capital
should be taxed at all….The supply-side
economists…have delivered the largest
genuinely free lunch I have seen in 25
years in this business, and I believe we
would have a better society if we followed
their advice.
Lucas (1990, 314) estimates the gain in welfare
from the elimination of all capital taxation in the
United States to be around 1 percent of annual
consumption and notes for comparison that
“it is about twice the welfare gain that I have
elsewhere estimated would result from elimi-
nating a 10 percent inflation, and something
like 20 times the gain from eliminating post-war-
sized business fluctuations. It is about 10 times
the gain Arnold Harberger…once estimated from
eliminating all product-market monopolies in
the U.S.” Subsequent studies by, among others,
King and Rebelo (1990) and Jones, Manuelli,
and Rossi (1993) have tended to reinforce
Lucas’ findings about the benefits of eliminating
capital income taxation.
In what follows, I examine a prototypical
multiple-sector model of endogenous growth
and use it to explore the welfare consequences
of some fairly simple tax reforms. One key
difference from existing analyses is that I use
recently constructed estimates of average mar-
ginal tax rates on capital and labor income and
consumption to calibrate the model. The “re-
forms” I consider consist of a halving of the tax
rates on capital income, labor income, and con-
sumption from their average levels over the past
thirty years. I find that there would be a signifi-
cant welfare gain associated with a reduction in
the tax rate on capital income and its replace-
ment with a consumption tax. However, I also
show that there could be an even larger gain
associated with a reduction in the tax rate on
labor income. This possibility arises because of
the importance of human capital accumulation
for the growth process.
The findings in this article reinforce the
general principle of efficient taxation that factors
that are supplied inelastically should be taxed
relatively more than factors that are supplied
elastically. In the analysis below, the only factor
that is supplied inelastically is raw, unimproved
labor. The return to raw labor is inextricably tied
to the return on human capital, which is sup-
plied elastically in the long run, and so effi-
ciency dictates that the burden of taxation be
shifted toward consumption purchases as a proxy
for taxing raw labor. In the model economy
studied below, the first-best tax scheme would
be to raise all revenue by taxing consumption
and to exempt both labor and capital income
from taxation.
Factor income taxation in the United States
Research on the aggregate implications of
changes in tax policy has long been hindered by
the lack of data on measures of the tax rates on
labor and capital income that correspond to the
relevant concepts suggested by economic theory.
For the United States, a number of authors have
attempted to construct measures of average mar-
ginal tax rates on total income using data on
individual tax returns (for example, Barro and
Sahasakul 1983). However, these estimates do
not distinguish between income derived from
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As for international comparisons, the problem is
compounded by differences in tax laws across
countries.
Recently, however, Mendoza, Razin, and
Tesar (1994) have tried to remedy this problem
by constructing estimates of tax rates on capital
and labor income, as well as on consumption
expenditure, for the G–7 industrial countries for
the period 1965–89. Their estimates aggregate
all the various deductions, allowances, and so
forth in a single measure and are the relevant
empirical counterparts to the tax variables con-
sidered in dynamic economic models of the sort
I examine below. Their measures of tax rates are
constructed as follows.
The average effective tax rate on sales of
consumption goods, tC, is defined as the ratio of
the sum of tax revenues from general taxes on
goods and services plus revenues from excise
taxes to the consumption tax base. The con-
sumption tax base is measured as the sum of
private final consumption expenditures and
government final consumption expenditures,
less compensation of employees paid by pro-
ducers of government services and tax revenues
from general taxes on goods and services and
excise taxes.
To construct a measure of the effective tax
rate on labor income, Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar
start by constructing a measure of the average
tax rate on total income that households receive.
This tax rate, tH, is defined as the ratio of the
total revenue from taxation of the income, prof-
its, and capital gains of individuals to the sum of
the operating surplus2 of private unincorporated
enterprises, households’ property, entrepreneur-
ial income, and wage and salary payments re-
ceived by the household sector.
The estimate of the tax rate on labor in-
come, tW, is then constructed as the product of
the tax rate on total household income and
wage and salary earnings, plus total social secu-
rity contributions and taxes on payroll and
workforce (which do not exist in the United
States), expressed as a fraction of the tax base
for labor income taxes. The tax base for labor
income taxes is measured as the sum of wage
and salary payments and employers’ contribu-
tions to social security.
The numerator of tax rate on capital in-
come, tR, is constructed as the product of the
average tax rate on total income and the operat-
ing surplus of private unincorporated enterprises
plus households’ property and entrepreneurial
income, to which is added the taxes on the in-
come, profits, and capital gains of corporations;
recurrent taxes on immovable property; and taxes
on financial and capital transactions. The de-
nominator is the base for capital taxation, which
is simply the operating surplus of the economy.
Figures 1 through 3 present Mendoza, Razin,
and Tesar’s tax rate estimates, which I have
extended through 1994 using data from recent
issues of the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development’s National Accounts
and Revenue Statistics publications. The figures
reveal a number of interesting differences in tax
policy across the major industrialized countries.
First, note that the tax rate on capital income in
the United States is relatively high in comparison
with those of other G–7 countries. In many
years, the tax rate on capital income in the
United States is exceeded only by the ludicrous
levels of capital income taxation in the U.K.,
although note that toward the end of the
sample, capital tax rates in Canada and Japan
overtake those of the United States. There is no
noticeable trend in the tax rate on capital in-
come in the United States, and the only country
for which such a trend (toward higher taxation
of capital income) is apparent is Japan, the
country that posted the most impressive growth
performance over this period. However, even in
Japan this trend seems to have reversed itself in
the late 1980s.
Second, note that for all the countries there
is a noticeable trend toward heavier taxation
of labor income over most of this period, with
the overall level of taxation on labor income in
the United States being around the middle of
the pack. Note that this trend seems to reverse
itself in the early 1980s in the U.K., in the late
1980s in the United States, and in the early 1990s
in Japan.
Figure 1



















4Finally, note that there is no discernible
trend in the rate of taxation of consumption
expenditures. The lowest tax rates on consump-
tion spending are in Japan and the United States
(both in the 4.5 percent to 6.5 percent range),
and the highest rates of consumption taxation
are in France. Comparing the levels of the three
types of taxes, it is striking how much more
heavily all the countries tax capital, as opposed
to either consumption or labor.
A model with endogenous growth
To get a handle on some of the issues
raised in the introduction, it is necessary to lay
out a model that allows tax policy to affect the
economy’s long-run growth rate. In this section,
I develop such a model. I consider an economy
in which households divide their time among
three different production activities: producing
goods that are consumed, producing capital
goods for use in production activities, and pro-
ducing human capital that augments the produc-
tivity of raw effort. I assume that factors (labor
and physical capital) supplied to each of these
activities are subject to taxation and that the tax
rate is the same regardless of the sector to which
factors are supplied. I also assume that the house-
hold sector owns all physical capital and that
human capital is embodied in individuals and
cannot be supplied independently of effort. Gov-
ernment activity will be restricted to levying
distortionary taxes on labor and capital income
and on consumption purchases, with the pro-
ceeds from these taxes distributed to the house-
hold sector in a lump-sum manner.
The representative household is assumed
to have preferences over consumption of final
goods and leisure, as summarized by the follow-
ing functional:









where Ct denotes consumption at date t, Lt de-
notes leisure or time devoted to nonmarket
activities at date t, and I assume that the dis-
count factor satisfies 1 > b > 0. Note I am
abstracting from consumer durables here: con-
sumption services that yield utility are identical
to purchases of consumer goods.3
I assume that the point-in-time utility func-
tion takes the following specific functional form:
( ) ( , ) log( ) log( ), 2 UCL C L tt t t =+ q
with  q > 0. The representative household is
assumed to choose a lifetime plan for consump-
tion and leisure at each date that maximizes
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where tC
t denotes the tax on consumption pur-
chases at date t, P K
t  denotes the relative price
of physical capital in terms of consumption
goods at date t, I K
t  denotes purchases of new
physical capital goods at date t, P H
t  denotes
the relative price of human capital in terms of
consumption goods at date t, I H
t  denotes pur-
chases of new human capital at date t, Wt
denotes the wage rate in terms of consump-
tion goods at date t, tW
t denotes the tax rate on
labor income at date t, Ht denotes the total
stock of human capital available for use in
production at date t, Nt denotes the total number
of hours devoted to market production at date t,
Rt denotes the rental rate on physical capital at
Figure 2
Labor Tax Rates in G–7 Countries
Percent
Figure 3
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t denotes the tax rate on income from
physical capital at date t, Kt denotes the total
stock of physical capital available for use in
production activities at date t, and Tt denotes
transfer payments from the government received
at date t.
I also assume that the amount of time
available for market and nonmarket (or leisure)
activities is normalized to 1, yielding the follow-
ing constraint on the allocation of time across
activities:







t  denotes hours devoted to production
of consumption goods at date t, N K
t  denotes
hours devoted to the production of physical
capital at date t, and N H
t  denotes hours devoted
to the production of human capital at date t.
Obviously,  Nt = N C
t  + N K
t  + N H
t . Finally, I assume
the following constraints on the accumulation of
physical and human capital:
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where 1 ³ dK ³ 0 denotes the rate of deprecia-
tion of physical capital and 1 ³ dH ³ 0 denotes
the rate of depreciation of human capital.
A few comments are in order. I am assum-
ing that the representative household is infinitely
lived, although this assumption is not really
crucial for what follows. An alternative, the
dynastic interpretation, has those making deci-
sions today taking into account the welfare
of future generations.4 I assume that the house-
hold must divide its time between leisure (or
nonmarket) activities and three different market
activities—namely, the production of consump-
tion goods, the production of physical capital,
and the production of human capital. I assume
that time spent in each of these market activi-
ties is equally distasteful from the perspective
of the representative household and, further-
more, that labor income generated in each of
these activities is taxed at the same rate, tW.
Total (pretax) labor income equals WHN, where
H = H C + H K + H H and N = N C + N K + N H.
Because effort can be costlessly reallocated
among the three market activities, the real wage
will be the same in all three. Note that W is the
wage per efficiency hour of effort in each sector.
I assume that physical capital is accumulated by
households and leased to firms at the prevailing
rental rate, R.
Again, because physical capital can be
costlessly reallocated among the three market
activities, the rental rate will be the same in all
three sectors. Finally, note that I assume that the
household receives a lump-sum transfer pay-
ment from the government equal to T.
The technologies for producing the three
types of goods are as follows:
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where AC, AK, AH > 0 denotes the level of total
factor productivity in each of the sectors, 1 > ai
> 0 for i = C, K, H, K C
t denotes physical capital
devoted to the production of consumption goods
at date t, H C
t denotes human capital devoted to
the production of consumption goods at date t,
K K
t denotes physical capital devoted to the pro-
duction of capital goods at date t, HK
t denotes
human capital devoted to the production of
physical capital at date t, K H
t denotes physical
capital devoted to the production of human
capital at date t, and H H
t denotes human capital
devoted to the production of human capital at
date t. Obviously, Kt = K C
t + K K
t + K H
t and Ht = H C
t
+ H K
t + H H
t. Note that with the various technolo-
gies specified as above, the quantity of hours N
and the quality of hours H are assumed to be
perfect substitutes in production, in that only the
combination NH matters in determining output.
The key feature of these technologies that al-
lows this model to generate endogenous steady-
state growth is the existence of constant returns
to scale in the factors that can be accumulated, K
and  H. Note, however, that this condition is
sufficient, not necessary (see Mulligan and Sala-
i-Martin 1993).
I assume a particularly simple government
sector. Specifically, I assume that the govern-
ment balances its budget each period and uses
its tax proceeds to make lump-sum transfer
payments to the household sector:
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Note that if I assume that both capital and labor
income are taxed at the same rate tY
t (i.e., there
is just a generic “income” tax), this expression
collapses to





where Yt = WtHtNt + RtKt.
6The representative household takes the
paths of factor prices {W t}¥
t =0, {Rt}¥
t =0, relative prices
{P K
t }¥
t =0, {P H
t }¥








t =0 as given in forming an
optimal plan for consumption, work effort, and
physical and capital accumulation over its ex-
pected (infinite) lifetime. The optimality condi-
tions for the household include the following:
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where lt denotes the marginal utility of income
at date t. The additional conditions are initial
conditions (K0, H0 given), transversality condi-
tions for the two types of capital and the rele-
vant budget and time constraints.












































where sL denotes the share of labor or wage
income in aggregate output and sC denotes
the share of private consumption in aggregate
output. This condition determines the con-
sumption–leisure trade-off within each time
period, with the terms of the trade-off dictated
by the preference parameter q; the prevailing
real wage rate, Wt; the available stock of human
capital, Ht; the tax rates on consumption pur-
chases, tC
t ; and wage income, tW
t . Inspection of
this condition suggests that there might be an
equivalence between taxes on labor income
and taxes on consumption spending when tax
rates are constant: specifically, a wage income
tax rate of tW
t  is equivalent to a tax on con-
sumption purchases of tC
t  = tW
t /(1 + tW
t ), and
a tax on consumption purchases equal to
tC
t  is equivalent to taxing labor income at a
tW
t  = tC
t /(1 + tC
t ) rate.5 However, this equiva-
lence does not hold in this model because the
return to human capital accumulation is realized
through labor income.
The second pair of equations above gov-
erns the optimal accumulation of physical and
human capital. The first equation states that
along an optimal path, the utility cost of forgo-
ing a unit of consumption to purchase P K
t  units
of physical capital must just equal the gain in
utility from doing so. An additional unit of capi-
tal will generate (1 – tR
t +1)Rt +1 additional units of
after-tax capital income next period and will
have a market value of P K
t +1(1 – dK ). The return
in utility terms is then obtained by multiplying
by the marginal utility of consumption next
period, lt +1. To express the return in terms of
period t utility, simply multiply by the discount
factor, b. The second equation can be inter-
preted analogously.
Price-taking behavior on the part of firms,
along with profit maximization and our assump-
tion that factors can move freely between differ-
ent productive activities, implies that the real
wage will be equated to the marginal product of
labor in each sector and the rental rate on
physical capital will be equated to the marginal
physical product of capital. Thus, we have
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tN i
t for i = C, K, H.
Balanced growth paths. To keep things trac-
table, I focus on the behavior of this economy
along a balanced growth path. Along such a
path, all the aggregate variables (with the excep-
tion of hours of work) grow at the same rate,
which I denote by g. Additionally, all tax rates
are constant. The balanced growth path is char-
acterized by the following equations:6
( )( ()( )() ) 19 1 1
1 gb t a d
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Along the balanced growth path, the aggregate






























which, of course, collapses to the familiar
Z = a/(1 – a) in a one-sector setting with no
taxation and inelastic labor supply (see, for
example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995).
Welfare. The gain or loss of welfare associ-
ated with a particular tax policy change can be
calculated as the number w that satisfies the
following equation:7









































where Ct(t0;.) denotes the level of consumption
at date t under the old tax policy and Ct(t1;.)
denotes the consumption level under the new
tax policy. We can interpret the number w as
the welfare cost of a tax reform. If w > 0, the
representative household is better off under the
old tax regime than under the new tax regime
and would be willing to pay a fraction of its
annual consumption up to w to remain under the
old regime. If w < 0, the representative house-
hold is better off under the new tax regime, and
the tax reform has a value equal to the fraction
w of initial consumption. Note that I impose a
balanced budget condition on all the tax reform
experiments to be conducted below: I assume
that any tax cut must be matched by tax in-
creases sufficient to leave the size of the govern-
ment relative to economic activity unchanged.
If we are willing to focus on comparisons
of steady-state balanced growth paths and
ignore transitional effects, it is straightforward
to show that, with the particular specification
of preferences employed above, the number w







































where we use primes “ ¢ ” to denote the values
of different variables after the policy change.
Inspection of this expression reveals that any
policy change that increases the share of con-
sumption in final output, increases the growth
rate, frees time for nonmarket or leisure activi-
ties, or increases the scale of activity will be
welfare-improving. Note also that this expres-
sion suggests that policy changes that have only
modest effects on the growth rate can poten-
tially have very large effects on welfare, depend-
ing on the value of the discount factor, b. In
what follows, we will see that tax reforms that
lower the tax rate on capital will typically cause
consumption’s share of output to fall, but this
decline will generally be offset by an increase in
the growth rate.
Before proceeding, I need to emphasize
that by ignoring transitional effects I obtain esti-
mates of welfare gains or losses associated with
tax reforms that are best interpreted as upper
bounds on what would occur in reality. Thus, a
tax reform that lowers tax rates on, say, physical
capital will typically lead to greater investment
during the transition to the new balanced growth
equilibrium. During the transitional period,
consumption will generally be lower and work
effort higher, acting to reduce the total welfare
improvement from the reform.8 The numbers
reported below are thus best interpreted as show-
ing how much better or worse off the average
household would be living in economies char-
acterized by different tax policies.
Calibration. To analyze the quantitative
implications of tax reforms in this model, I need
to assign values to the various parameters that
characterize tastes and technology. The values
for the key parameters were chosen to be con-
sistent with some key features of the U.S.
economy. The discount factor was set equal to
0.98, which implies a pure rate of time prefer-
ence of just over 2 percent per annum. The
parameter q was chosen so as to generate a
fraction of the time endowment devoted to
market activities equal to one-third. The param-
eters AC, AK, AH were all set equal to 0.34: this
generates a steady-state growth rate equal to 1.7
percent per annum in the baseline economy,
which is approximately the long-run growth rate
of per capita GDP in the United States over the
past fifty years. The sectoral classifications used
in the model do not map easily into those used
in the National Income and Product Accounts,
making it difficult to obtain estimates of the
elasticities aC, aK, aH using the standard factor
share approach. An alternative is to simply as-
sume that the elasticities are about the same in
each sector and use the observation that labor
typically accounts for about two-thirds of aggre-
gate output. Thus, the parameters aC, a K,  a H
were set equal to 0.36, 0.35, and 0.37, respec-
tively. The depreciation rate for capital, dK, was
set equal to 5 percent somewhat arbitrarily. This
is lower than the 10 percent rate of depreciation
for both physical and human capital assumed by
King and Rebelo and employed in much of the
real business cycle literature but generates a
more realistic steady-state output share of in-
vestment in physical capital. Absent any detailed
information on the depreciation rate for human
capital, I set dH equal to 1 percent.9 This value is
a lot lower than the 10 percent value used by
King and Rebelo (1990) and Jones, Manuelli,
and Rossi (1993) but close to the zero value
used by Lucas (1990).
Finally, the steady-state tax rates were set
using the estimates reported in Mendoza, Razin,
and Tesar (1994). I simply set tR, tW, and tC
8equal to the means of their estimated tax rates
on capital, labor, and consumption, which yield
values for these parameters equal to 0.429, 0.247,
and 0.057, respectively. Note that the estimate
for the tax rate on labor is probably a bit on the
low side, as it does not take into account the
trend toward higher taxation of labor income
over the past thirty years.
Tax reforms
Table 1 illustrates the growth and welfare
effects of a series of simple (but dramatic) tax
reforms in the context of this model. The first
row of the table reports the levels of tax rates in
the baseline economy, along with the share of
consumption, the growth rate, and the fraction
of time devoted to market activities. Note that
the share of consumption seems rather small,
but this is because I am using a measure of
output more comprehensive than GDP. Private
consumption expenditures account for about
two-thirds of U.S. GDP, while in the baseline
economy consumer spending accounts for less
than 60 percent of aggregate output. The aggre-
gate output concept employed here is broader
than GDP in that it includes the output of the
human-capital-producing sector. Thus, Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) note that GDP fails to
include the value of time forgone by students
and at least some of the time expended in on-
the-job training: they quote estimates that up to
half of the value of investment in human capital
is excluded from GDP. The remaining nine rows
in the table report the consequences of various
tax reforms, where the reform in each case
consists of a halving of the relevant tax rate.
Starting with a reduction in the capital tax
rate that is financed by higher consumption
taxes, we see that the value of such a reform to
the representative household is equal to just
under 31 percent of initial consumption. Fur-
thermore, such a reform adds almost a full per-
centage point to the economy’s growth rate
(boosting it to 2.5 percent per annum) and is
accompanied by an increase in employment.
However, the reduction in the tax rate on capital
income requires an almost fourfold increase in
the tax rate on consumption to maintain budget
balance. By contrast, the same reduction in the
tax rate on capital income when financed by
higher labor income taxes is welfare-reducing:
the economy’s growth rate slows to 1.3 percent
per annum, and the representative household
would be willing to pay up to 12 percent of its
annual consumption to avoid such a tax reform.
If instead the reduction in the capital tax rate is
financed by equal increases in consumption and
labor income tax rates, the growth rate of the
economy rises by a trivial 0.1 of a percent, but
the representative household is nevertheless bet-
ter off, to the tune of about 5.1 percent of initial
annual consumption.
The second set of experiments considers
the implications of reductions in the tax rate on
labor income. A halving of the tax rate on labor
income financed by increased taxes on con-
sumption boosts the economy’s growth rate to
2.8 percent per annum and has a value to the
Table 1
Some Simple Tax Reforms
Tax rate Tax rate Tax rate Share of Growth Fraction of Welfare
on capital on labor on consumption consumption rate time worked cost
tR tW tC sC 1–g N w
Baseline .429 .247 .057 .572 1.7 .330 —
Cut capital income taxes, finance with
higher consumption taxes .215 .247 .201 .477 2.5 .341 –.307
Cut capital income taxes, finance with
higher labor income taxes .215 .366 .057 .575 1.3 .291 .120
Cut capital income taxes, finance with
higher consumption and labor income taxes .215 .312 .122 .530 1.8 .313 –.051
Cut labor income taxes, finance with
higher consumption taxes .429 .124 .205 .477 2.8 .376 –.385
Cut labor income taxes, finance with
higher capital income taxes .646 .124 .057 .596 1.5 .355 .165
Cut labor income taxes, finance with
higher consumption and capital income taxes .517 .124 .145 .522 2.3 .367 –.154
Cut consumption taxes, finance with
higher capital income taxes .471 .247 .029 .592 1.5 .328 .062
Cut consumption taxes, finance with
higher labor income taxes .429 .271 .029 .590 1.5 .322 .059
Cut consumption taxes, finance with
higher capital and labor income taxes .444 .262 .029 .590 1.5 .324 .059
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percent of initial annual consumption! Further-
more, this tax reform requires an increase in the
tax rate on consumption expenditures only
marginally higher than that required to finance
a halving of the tax rate on capital (to 20.5
percent as opposed to 20.1 percent). The same
reduction in the tax rate on labor income when
financed by higher capital tax rates is welfare-
reducing and slows the economy’s growth rate
from 1.7 percent per annum to 1.5 percent. If
the labor income tax cut is financed by equally
sized increases in the tax rates on capital income
and consumption, I again get higher growth,
and the value of the reform to the representative
household is equal to 15.4 percent of its initial
annual level of consumption.
Finally, the third set of experiments con-
siders the implications of reductions in the tax
rate on consumption expenditures financed by
higher taxes on either capital or labor income or
both. In all cases, the result is to slow the
growth rate to 1.5 percent per annum, with a
welfare cost associated with the reform equal to
about 6 percent of initial consumption.
The results in Table 1 are in some cases
quite dramatic and lend support to the idea that
a shift in the burden of taxation toward heavier
taxation of consumption spending and away
from taxation of capital and labor could have
beneficial effects on the economy’s long-run
rate of growth. More generally, the results illus-
trate the principle that factors that are supplied
elastically should receive more favorable tax
treatment (from an efficiency perspective) than
factors that are supplied inelastically. In the
model studied here, the endowment of raw time
that each household has is the factor that is
supplied inelastically in the long run, whereas
the factors that can be accumulated (physical
and human capital) are supplied elastically. Tax-
ing the flow of consumption services relatively
heavily is in some sense equivalent to taxing the
endowment of unimproved time.
Figures 4 through 7 illustrate the welfare
and growth effects of reductions in capital and
labor taxes for reductions ranging from zero to
complete elimination of the tax. Starting with
Figure 4, we see that marginal reductions in the
tax rate on capital income that are financed by
higher labor income taxes will have a very small
effect on welfare, but larger reductions (greater
than 10 percent or so) will cause welfare to
decline. Complete elimination of the tax on
capital income, if financed by higher labor in-
come taxes, would have a welfare cost equal to
just under 40 percent of steady-state consump-
tion. By contrast, even relatively modest re-
ductions in capital taxes financed by higher
consumption taxes produce welfare gains im-
mediately. Figure 5 shows what happens when
we replace labor income taxes with either con-
sumption or capital income taxes. Mirroring what
we see in Figure 4, marginal reductions in labor
income taxes that are financed by higher capital
taxes lead to negligible welfare changes. A re-
form that completely eliminates the labor in-
come tax and replaces it with higher taxes on
capital income has a welfare cost of about 60
percent of steady-state consumption. Again, re-
placing the labor income tax with a consump-
tion tax produces welfare gains for even relatively
small changes.
Figures 6 and 7 show us what happens to
the economy’s growth rate when we cut capital
and labor taxes by progressively larger amounts.
Figure 4
Cut Capital Income Tax Rates
Welfare cost
(Percent of steady-state consumption)
Figure 5
Cut Labor Income Tax Rates
Welfare cost
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10In both cases, the biggest increase in the growth
rate is achieved when we replace capital or
labor income taxes with consumption taxes. Re-
placing capital income taxes with higher labor
income taxes causes an immediate decline in
the growth rate, but marginal changes in labor
income taxes that are financed by higher capital
income taxes leave the growth rate unchanged.
Conclusions and caveats
This article has presented a preliminary
analysis of the welfare and growth effects of
some simple tax reforms using a relatively stan-
dard three-sector endogenous growth model. I
have shown that a shift away from the taxation
of capital toward taxation of consumption is po-
tentially welfare-enhancing, and that even larger
welfare gains might be obtained by substituting
consumption taxes for taxes on labor income.
However, a number of caveats surround
these findings. It would be incorrect to interpret
my results as indicative of the likely welfare
consequences of a real-world tax reform, as I
have abstracted from transitional dynamics. Elimi-
nation or reduction of taxes on capital income
would be followed by a period of higher invest-
ment and increased work effort that would tend
to reduce (but not offset) the gains from the tax
cut. Also, I have focused on a very stylized
economy. It is by now well known that the
welfare and growth rate effects of reducing or
eliminating taxation of capital are very sensitive
to some model parameters (particularly the elas-
ticity of substitution between capital and labor
in production), and it would be important to
carry out a sensitivity analysis of the model
before deriving specific policy recommendations.
Finally, I have abstracted from the ques-
tion of the credibility of the various hypothetical
tax reforms. More favorable tax treatment of
capital will generally encourage the accumula-
tion of capital, but only if investors believe that
the lower tax rates will remain in place. How-
ever, once the private sector has built up capital
stock in response to lower tax rates, the govern-
ment faces an incentive to raise the tax rates on
capital to confiscatory levels. Investors will real-
ize that the government is likely to face this
incentive and so will be wary of betting too
much on the persistence of lower capital tax
rates into the future.
My analysis also has some implications for
the Hall–Rabushka flat tax proposal and the
national sales tax proposal. Recognizing that
human capital is a factor of production that
can be accumulated just like physical capital
means that, from a tax perspective, human
capital ought to receive similar treatment. Thus,
under the Hall–Rabushka flat tax proposal,
firms would get to expense purchases of capital
equipment. My analysis suggests that efficiency
would dictate that households should be able
to expense investments in human capital. Pro-
posals to replace income taxes with sales taxes
typically would exempt business purchases of
capital. Again, my analysis suggests that we
would also want to exempt from taxation house-
hold expenditures on education that augment
human capital.
Notes
I thank Greg Huffman for useful comments during the
preparation of this article. Jeremy Nalewaik assisted
with the data. The reviewers, Evan Koenig and Lori
Taylor, provided suggestions that helped clarify key
points.
1 Ramsey, however, does not make this argument.
2 Operating surplus measures the income earned by tan-
Figure 6
Cut Capital Income Tax Rates
Growth rate
Figure 7
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of production from their participation in production.
3 It is also worth noting at this point that this measure of
consumption differs in important regards from the
figure for private consumption expenditures that is
reported in the national income and product accounts
(NIPA). The NIPA measure of consumption expendi-
tures includes purchases of durable goods, from
which I am abstracting in this analysis. But more
importantly, the NIPA measure includes as part of
consumption spending on education. Insofar as such
expenditures augment the stock of human capital, they
ought to be treated as investment expenditures.
4 Use of the infinitely lived representative household
construct precludes consideration of issues of intra-
and intergenerational equity.
5 See, for example, Becsi (1993) for a discussion of
such equivalences. It is perhaps worth noting that
such equivalences are implicit in various tax reform
proposals.
6 The complete set of equations characterizing the
balanced growth path is presented in the appendix.
7 See, for example, King and Rebelo (1990).
8 Thus, for example, Lucas (1990) estimates that the
welfare gains associated with the elimination of all
capital taxes in the United States would equal about 6
percent of annual consumption when transition effects
are ignored but less than 1 percent when transitional
costs are taken into account.
9 Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989) report estimates of
investment in human capital in the United States that
are at least four times the magnitude of investment in
nonhuman or physical capital and estimate that the
value of the stock of human capital is over eleven
times the value of the stock of physical capital. In the
baseline economy studied here, the stock of human
capital is about five times the stock of physical capital.
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12Appendix
Complete Set of Equations Characterizing the Balanced Growth Path
The full set of equations characterizing the
balanced growth path is as follows. From the inter-
temporal efficiency condition for physical capital
accumulation, we have
(A.1) g = b((1–tR)aKAK(Z K)aK–1 + (1–dK)).
The intertemporal efficiency condition for human
capital accumulation is
(A.2) g = b((1–tW)(1–aH)AH(Z H)aHN + (1–dH)).
Equating rental rates on capital across sectors
gives us the conditions
(A.3)
(A.4)
From the labor–leisure trade-off we obtain
(A.5)
while the resource constraint for the consumption
goods sector can be written as
(A.6)
From the capital goods sector resource constraint
we have
(A.7)
and from the human-capital-producing sector we
obtain
(A.8)
The economy-wide aggregate resource constraint
can be written as
(A.9)
By definition,
(A.10) 1 = fC + fK + fH.
The human capital to output ratio is given by
(A.11)
The physical capital to output ratio is given by
(A.12)
Finally, we have the definitions of relative prices:
(A.13)
(A.14)
I define sC, the share of consumption in total out-
put, and sL = WHN/Y, the share of labor compensa-
tion in total output. Note that the measure of total
output used here is more comprehensive than the
usual GDP-type measure: GDP is generally
thought to undermeasure investment in human
capital. The above is a system of fourteen
equations in fourteen unknowns: g, Z C, Z K, Z H, N,
fC, fK, fH, sC, sL, (H/Y ), (K/Y ), P K, P H.
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